Pointing as an Instrumental Gesture : Gaze Representation Through Indication

The research of the first author was supported by a Fulbright Visiting Scholar Fellowship and developed in 2012 during a period of research visit at the University of Memphis.Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Schlussfolgerung oder Vertrautheit? Verkörperte Wurzeln der sozialen Kognition

I consider two distinct deflationary theories in social cognition that aim to explain action understanding without demanding meta-representational or mindreading processes: the first one is the ‘teleological stance hypothesis’ (TSH), claiming that we infer the intended goal of a certain observed action based on the mere perception of its effects and of its situational constraints; I decided to dub the second one ‘the embodied familiarity hypothesis’ (EFH) to comprise all the theories claiming that we recognize the intended goal of a certain action based on the perceptual or motoric expertise developed within the sensorimotor contingencies associated to that action’s context. TSH’s main requirement is that the observer could ascribe efficiency, and therefore rationality, to the observed agent’s movement, while EFH’s main requirement is that the observer were somehow exposed to the perceptual or motoric details of the observed agent’s action. I argue that EFH describes a more primitive and fundamental form of action understanding, i.e. one that is necessarily presupposed by TSH: in fact, while recognizing efficiency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for detecting goal-relatedness, some kind of perceptual or motoric familiarity with the details of the observed action’s context is always necessary for any ascription of efficiency, and therefore of rationality, to the observed agent. I conclude that, while TSH might certainly be effective in describing certain rational forms of action understanding, it implicitly requires EFH to be true, as its inferential system would be groundless without an assumed familiar background of embodied expertise.Razmatram dvije različite deflacijske teorije u socijalnoj spoznaji koje nastoje objasniti razumijevanje djelovanja bez potreba za metareprezentacijskim procesima ili procesima čitanja uma. Prva je »hipoteza teleološkog stava« (TSH), koja tvrdi da o namjeravanom cilju određenog opaženog djelovanja zaključujemo samo na temelju opažanja učinaka djelovanja i situacijskih ograničenja. Drugu teoriju sam odlučio nazvati »hipoteza utjelovljene sličnosti« (EFH) kako bih obuhvatio sve teorije koje tvrde da namjeravani cilj određenog djelovanja prepoznajemo na temelju opažajne ili motoričke ekspertize razvijene unutar senzomotoričkih kontingencija povezanih s kontekstom djelovanja. Temeljni je zahtjev TSH da promatrač može pripisati efikasnost, stoga i racionalnost, opaženim pokretima djelatnika, dok je temeljni zahtjev EFH teorije taj da je promatrač na neki način izložen opažajnim ili motoričkim detaljima opaženog djelatnikovog djelovanja. Tvrdim da EFH opisuje primitivniji i temeljniji oblik razumijevanja djelovanja, tj. onaj oblik koji TSH nužno pretpostavlja: ustvari, iako prepoznavanje efikasnosti nije ni nužan niti dovoljan uvjet za detektiranje povezanost i s ciljem, neka vrsta opažajne ili motoričke upoznatosti s detaljima opaženog konteksta djelovanja uvijek je nužna za bilo kakvo pripisivanje efikasnosti, a time i racionalnosti, promatranom djelatniku. Zaključujem da, iako TSH zasigurno može biti učinkovita u opisu određenih racionalnih oblika razumijevanja djelovanja, implicitno zahtijeva da EFH bude istinita, budući da bi takav sustav zaključivanja bio neutemeljen bez pretpostavljene upoznate pozadine utjelovljene ekspertize.J’examine deux théories de cognition sociale déflationnistes et distinctes, visant à expliquer la compréhension de l’action sans recours à des processus méta-représentatifs ou à ceux de lecture de pensée : la première est « l’hypothèse de la position téléologique » (TSH), affirmant que nous inférons le but visé d’une certaine action observée en nous fondant sur la simple perception des ses effets et de ses contraintes situationnelles ; j’ai décidé de baptiser la seconde « l’hypothèse de la familiarité incarnée » (EFH) afin d’englober toutes les théories qui affirment que nous reconnaissons l’objectif visé d’une certaine action en nous appuyant sur l’expertise perceptuelle ou motrice développée dans le cadre des contingences sensorimotrices associées au contexte de cette action. Le critère principal de TSH est que l’observateur pourrait attribuer l’efficacité, et par conséquent la rationalité, au mouvement de l’agent observé, tandis que le critère principal d’EFH est que l’observateur soit en quelque sorte exposé aux détails perceptifs ou moteurs de l’action de l’agent observé. J’affirme qu’EFH décrit une forme plus primitive et fondamentale de la compréhension de l’action, soit une forme qui est nécessairement présupposée par TSH : en fait, tout en reconnaissant que l’efficacité n’est ni une condition nécessaire ni suffisante pour détecter le rapport avec l’objectif, une sorte de familiarité perceptuelle ou motrice avec les détails du contexte de l’action observée est toujours nécessaire à toute attribution de l’efficacité, et par conséquent de la rationalité, à l’agent observé. Je conclus que, tant que TSH pourrait certainement être efficace pour décrire certaines formes rationnelles de la compréhension de l’action, elle requiert implicitement qu’EFH soit vraie, puisque son système inférentiel serait sans fondement s’il était sans un contexte familier supposé de l’expertise incarnée.Ich ergründe zwei unterschiedliche deflationäre Theorien innerhalb der sozialen Kognition, die angestrebt sind, das Verständnis des Handelns zu erläutern – ohne die Bedürfnisse nach metarepräsentativen oder gedankenleserischen Prozessen. Die erste ist die ‚Hypothese der teleologischen Haltung‘ (TSH), die behauptet, dass wir das beabsichtigte Ziel eines bestimmten beobachteten Handelns auf der Grundlage der bloßen Wahrnehmung dessen Effekte und Situationseinschränkungen erschließen. Ich habe beschlossen, die zweite Theorie ‚Hypothese der verkörperten Vertrautheit‘ (EFH) zu nennen, um sämtliche Theorien einzuschließen, die darauf bestehen, dass wir das beabsichtigte Ziel eines bestimmten beobachteten Handelns auf der Basis perzeptueller oder motorischer Expertise erkennen, die innerhalb der sensomotorischen, mit dem Kontext dieses Handelns verbundenen Kontingenzen entwickelt wurde. TSHs Hauptanforderung besagt, der Beobachter könne die Effizienz, und damit die Rationalität, den beobachteten Bewegungen des Handelnden zuschreiben, während EFHs Hauptanforderung lautet, die Beobachter seien auf irgendeine Weise perzeptuellen oder motorischen Details des beobachteten Handelns des Agierenden ausgesetzt. Ich vertrete die Ansicht, dass die EFH eine primitivere und fundamentalere Form des Handelnsverständnisses beschreibt, d. h. jene Form, die von der TSH notwendigerweise vorausgesetzt wird: In der Tat, während die Effizienzerkennung weder eine notwendige noch eine hinreichende Bedingung für die Detektion der Verwandtheit mit dem Ziel ist, erweist sich eine Art perzeptuelle oder motorische Vertrautheit mit den Details des beobachteten Handelnskontextes als ständig notwendig für jedwede Zuschreibung von Effizienz, und demgemäß auch von Rationalität, an den beobachteten Handelnden. Ich ziehe die Schlussfolgerung, dass während die TSH in der Schilderung gewisser rationaler Formen des Handelnsverständnisses sicherlich effektiv sein könnte, verlangt sie implizit das Zutreffen der EFH, da ihr Folgerungssystem ohne den angenommenen bekannten Hintergrund der verkörperten Expertise haltlos wäre

Sympathy for Dolores: Moral Consideration for Robots Based on Virtue and Recognition

This paper motivates the idea that social robots should be credited as moral patients, building on an argumentative approach that combines virtue ethics and social recognition theory. Our proposal answers the call for a nuanced ethical evaluation of human-robot interaction that does justice to both the robustness of the social responses solicited in humans by robots and the fact that robots are designed to be used as instruments. On the one hand, we acknowledge that the instrumental nature of robots and their unsophisticated social capabilities prevent any attribution of rights to robots, which are devoid of intrinsic moral dignity and personal status. On the other hand, we argue that another form of moral consideration—not based on rights attribution—can and must be granted to robots. The reason is that relationships with robots offer to the human agents important opportunities to cultivate both vices and virtues, like social interaction with other human beings. Our argument appeals to social recognition to explain why social robots, unlike other technological artifacts, are capable of establishing with their human users quasi-social relationships as pseudo-persons. This recognition dynamic justifies seeing robots as worthy of moral consideration from a virtue ethical standpoint as it predicts the pre-reflective formation of persistent affective dispositions and behavioral habits that are capable of corrupting the human user’s character. We conclude by drawing attention to a potential paradox drawn forth by our analysis and by examining the main conceptual conundrums that our approach has to face

Can robots make us better humans? : virtuous robotics and the good life with artificial agents

This position paper proposes a novel approach to the ethical design of social robots. We coin the term “Virtuous Robotics” to describe Human–Robot Interaction (HRI) designed to help humans reach a higher level of moral development. Our approach contrasts with mainstream approaches to robot design inspired by the other normative theories, Consequentialism and Deontology. In the paper we theoretically justify our proposal, illustrating how the Virtuous Robotics approach allows us to discriminate between positive and negative applications of robotics systems, of which we provide examples. From an ethical perspective, our proposal is theoretically robust because it is based on the assistive role played by the robot rather than the robot’s moral agency. From a designer’s perspective, Virtuous Robotics is technically feasible because it transfers the cognitive burden of HRI from the robot to the user, bypassing the need for complex decision-making abilities. From the user’s perspective, it is concretely advantageous, because it envisions a realistic way to make robots morally desirable in our lives, as supports for personal betterment and fulfilment

Reducing the environmental impact of surgery on a global scale: systematic review and co-prioritization with healthcare workers in 132 countries

Abstract Background Healthcare cannot achieve net-zero carbon without addressing operating theatres. The aim of this study was to prioritize feasible interventions to reduce the environmental impact of operating theatres. Methods This study adopted a four-phase Delphi consensus co-prioritization methodology. In phase 1, a systematic review of published interventions and global consultation of perioperative healthcare professionals were used to longlist interventions. In phase 2, iterative thematic analysis consolidated comparable interventions into a shortlist. In phase 3, the shortlist was co-prioritized based on patient and clinician views on acceptability, feasibility, and safety. In phase 4, ranked lists of interventions were presented by their relevance to high-income countries and low–middle-income countries. Results In phase 1, 43 interventions were identified, which had low uptake in practice according to 3042 professionals globally. In phase 2, a shortlist of 15 intervention domains was generated. In phase 3, interventions were deemed acceptable for more than 90 per cent of patients except for reducing general anaesthesia (84 per cent) and re-sterilization of ‘single-use’ consumables (86 per cent). In phase 4, the top three shortlisted interventions for high-income countries were: introducing recycling; reducing use of anaesthetic gases; and appropriate clinical waste processing. In phase 4, the top three shortlisted interventions for low–middle-income countries were: introducing reusable surgical devices; reducing use of consumables; and reducing the use of general anaesthesia. Conclusion This is a step toward environmentally sustainable operating environments with actionable interventions applicable to both high– and low–middle–income countries

Sympathy for Dolores: Moral Consideration for Robots based on Virtue and Recognition

This paper motivates the idea that social robots should be credited as moral patients, building on an argumentative approach that combines virtue ethics and social recognition theory. Our proposal answers the call for a nuanced ethical evaluation of humanrobot interaction that does justice to both the robustness of the social responses solicited in humans by robots and the fact that robots are designed to be used as instruments. On the one hand, we acknowledge that the instrumental nature of robots and their unsophisticated social capabilities prevent any attribution of rights to robots, which are devoid of intrinsic moral dignity and personal status. On the other hand, we argue that another form of moral consideration—not based on rights attribution—can and must be granted to robots. The reason is that relationships with robots offer to the human agents important opportunities to cultivate both vices and virtues, like social interaction with other human beings. Our argument appeals to social recognition to explain why social robots, unlike other technological artifacts, are capable of establishing with their human users quasi-social relationships as pseudo-persons. This recognition dynamic justifies seeing robots as worthy of moral consideration from a virtue ethical standpoint as it predicts the pre-reflective formation of persistent affective dispositions and behavioral habits that are capable of corrupting the human user's character. We conclude by drawing attention to a potential paradox drawn forth by our analysis and by examining the main conceptual conundrums that our approach has to face

Autonomous Systems and Technology Resistance: New Tools for Monitoring Acceptance, Trust, and Tolerance

We introduce the notion of Tolerance for autonomous artificial agents (and its antithetical concept, Intolerance), motivating its theoretical adoption in the fields of social robotics and human—agent interaction, where it can effectively complement two contiguous, but essentially distinct, constructs—Acceptance and Trust—that are broadly used by researchers. We offer a comprehensive conceptual model of Tolerance, construed as a user’s insusceptibility or resilience to Autonomy Estrangement (i.e., the uncanny sense of isolation and displacement experienced by the humans who believe, for right or wrong reasons, that robots can subvert and/or control their lives). We also refer to Intolerance to indicate the opposite property, that is the user’s susceptibility or proneness to Autonomy Estrangement. Thus, Tolerance and Intolerance are inverse representations of the same phenomenological continuum, with Intolerance increasing when Tolerance decreases and vice versa. While Acceptance and Trust measure how the user’s interaction with a particular robot is satisfying and efficacious, the dyad Tolerance/Intolerance reflects how the user’s attitude is affected by deeply held normative beliefs about robots in general. So defined, a low Tolerance (that is a high Intolerance) is expected to correlate to antagonistic responses toward the prospect of adoption: specifically, Intolerant attitudes predict the kind of anxious and hostile behaviours toward Agents that originate from the concerns that autonomous systems could deeply disrupt the lives of humans (affecting their work cultures, ways of living, systems of values, etc.) or dominate them (making humans redundant, undermining their authority, threatening their uniqueness, etc.). Thus, Negative beliefs and worldviews about Agents are the cause of the Intolerant attitude toward Agents, which predicts Autonomy Estrangement, which in turn correlates to low Adoption Propensity and avoidance and rejection behaviours

Unfulfilled prophecies in sport performance: Active inference and the choking effect

2020, Imprint Academic. All rights reserved. Choking effect (choke) is the tendency of expert athletes to underperform in high-stakes situations. We propose an account of choke based on active inference - a corollary of the free energy principle in cognitive neuroscience. The active inference scheme can explain certain forms of sensorimotor skills disruption in terms of precision-modulated imbalance between sensory input and higher-level predictions. This model predicts that choke arises when the system fails to attenuate the error signal generated by proprioceptive sensory input. We aim to expand the previous formulations of this model to integrate the contribution of other causal factors, such as confidence erosion, taking into account the empirical evidence emerging from the psychological research on performance disruption in sports. Our expanded model allows us to unify the two main theories of performance disruption in the sport psychology literature, i.e. the self-monitoring/execution focus theory and the distraction/ overload theory, while recognizing that the typical manifestations of choke in sport competitions are best accounted for by self-monitoring/ execution focus theory. We illustrate how active inference explains some experiential aspects of choke that are familiar to sport psychol-ogists and practitioners: choke is a skill-level specific phenomenon; alleviated by ritual-like pre-performance routines; aggravated by per-sonal and contextual factors such as self-confidence erosion and performance anxiety; accompanied by a drop in the attenuation of the sense of agency normally associated with high performance and flow states

A low-cost autonomous attention assessment system for robot intervention with autistic children

Attention is an essential mental process that is important to achieve learning progress. We cannot get better in our academic learning unless we concentrate our attention on the person giving the educational material, such as the teacher or trainer. Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) may have attention difficulties that can directly influence their academic skills. In recent years, robot intervention in autism therapy and assessment is becoming a popular research topic due to its role in enhancing children's attention more than a regular human therapist, as well as, the increasing number of autism children compared to the availability of professional therapists. Robot intervention helps in reducing therapy time and makes early therapeutics sessions easier and much promising. Many researches have been conducted to develop robot intervention techniques for ASD children, and some methods have already been used to assess autistic individuals' attention during the robot intervention sessions. Yet, the existing attention assessment methods are either very complex or simple with one measured interaction cue only. This paper presents a practical and low-cost automatic approach to assess autistic individuals' attention during robot intervention; addressing multiple interaction cues. Experimental results show that the proposed attention assessment system could accurately measure the child attention and enhance therapy progress. This automatic attention system can open a new era for utilizing technologies to monitor students' attentions in the class to enhance educational systems